Thursday, February 20, 2014
Russow
One major takeaway, for me, from this week's readings was the fact that I really didn't like Russow's claim. I understood her general hypothesis, but for me it wasn't enough to agree with her. It's agreeable that duty can't be assigned to a class and really only to persons - but then I don't think that duty was the correct term to be using in her essay. One of my major complaints about her argument is her failure to include a value system to appropriate which duties are given to each species. If she is going to make that a part of her argument in deciding duty, she should briefly explain why she thinks some animals would get a "weaker or stronger" duty. I think by doing that she would be better able to attract people to her warrants. Another issue I have with her argument is that if you have two individuals of the same species, how can you decide to which one do you owe more duty? Because you really can't do that it would only be logical to have the same duty to each member of that community - which in turn is allowing community duties, undermining her entire argument; as does the value of habitat. How can you give duty to an animal without giving duty to its immediate habitat as well? I can appreciate Russow's argument for what it is, but I just don't think that I will be jumping on the aesthetic value of animals any time in the near present.
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
I was in the same boat with Russow's claim. I understood her theory well enough, but beyond theory, her idea seemed too rigid for it to be put into action. A value system would definitely help round out Russow's theory and clarify her wishy-washy term of "duty."
ReplyDeleteRussow might reply, given the position she advocates, that we may choose an individual member of a species based on a number of variant factors; e.g., we may arbitrarily select individuals or we may select members that fulfil criteria reliant upon desirable aesthetic attributes. She may override any sort of equal consideration or duty with designations of value based on her preferences and still remain consistent in her theory. However, this sort of artificial selection seems unsatisfactory as you suggest.
ReplyDelete